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Simulation is a powerful method in science and engineering. However, simulation is an umbrella term, and its
meaning and goals differ among disciplines. Rapid advances in neuroscience and computing draw
increasing attention to large-scale brain simulations. What is the meaning of simulation, and what should
the method expect to achieve? We discuss the concept of simulation from an integrated scientific and
philosophical vantage point and pinpoint selected issues that are specific to brain simulation.Similar to its Latin origin, similis, i.e., ‘‘like’’, simulation refers to
the process and product of making something appear or
perform like something else. The appreciation of the power of
simulation is deeply embedded in our cognition and even
echoed in creation myths that claim that humans themselves
stem from the embodiment of a simulation: ‘‘Then God said,
Let us make mankind in our image (Genesis, 1,26).’’ Our brain
is innately inclined to simulate responses of our conspecifics
not only during the development of the behavioral repertoire of
the young individual but also in adulthood. Accordingly, it is
equipped with neuronal circuits that were posited to specialize
in simulating the action of the other (Mukamel et al., 2010;
Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia; 2010). Some authors have suggested
that we may understand emotions and gestures, including
speech, because we have the biological machinery to produce
them ourselves and can simulate the act in our mind (Galantucci
et al., 2006; D’Ausilio et al., 2009; Mukamel et al., 2010). We do
pay a price. Our tendency to copy and simulate the other can
lead to excessive conformity and long-lasting false memories
(Edelson et al., 2011). However, we also gain a lot. Our ability
to simulate scenarios in our mind allows us to perform mental
time travel into the future, apparently providing an immense
phylogenetic advantage (Dudai and Carruthers, 2005; Schacter
et al., 2007).
The term ‘‘simulation’’ can acquire different meanings in
different contexts. Here we will restrict our treatment to simula-
tion in science and engineering. In these disciplines, simulation
involves mathematical and engineering methods. Our treatment
here, however, is qualitative and aimed at portraying the concept
in a broad brush to a broad audience while noting a few issues
that are particularly relevant to brain research. Scientists and
engineers routinely practice various types of simulations and
devote textbooks to themethodology in their own corresponding
fields (Cloud and Rainey, 1998; Ross, 2012; Trappenberg, 2010).
Some authors discuss the value, advantages, and constraints of
simulation approaches in general and in the context of other
research methodologies in their disciplines in particular (Check-
land, 1999; Dudai, 2002; Robinson, 2004). Aspects of simulation
are also discussed in the philosophical literature (e.g., Gru¨ne-
Yanoff and Weirich, 2010; Winsberg, 2003), but the scope and254 Neuron 84, October 22, 2014 ª2014 Elsevier Inc.accessibility of this discourse and its influence on practicing sci-
entists are limited.
Different terms referring to the notion of simulation in general
may overlap, merge, or become synonymous. These terms,
which are not mutually exclusive, include modeling, reconstruc-
tion, imitation, and duplication. Because we deem the clarifica-
tion of terms important for effective discourse, especially when
this discourse bridges disciplines, we will first attempt to briefly
sort out different terms and then define and focus on the type of
simulation we consider pertinent to the current brain sciences.
In brief, ‘‘modeling’’ refers to creating, mostly, nowadays,
computationally on a computer, a construct that mimics or sim-
plifies and is used to explore states or functions of the original
system or its parts and further its understanding (we will return
to the meaning of ‘‘understanding’’ below). Types of models
differ inter alia with regard to the information fed into the model,
ranging from experimental to mock data and from data-based to
postulated principles and relationships. ‘‘Reconstruction’’ in the
context of our discourse is the act of building an abstract or
physical system that resembles, at least partially, the original.
In the simulation of a physical system by reconstruction, one
may go through steps in which only elements of the original
are replaced by artifacts to simulate the native function of the
original parts. One then tests whether the substitution imple-
ments the desired state or function in the system. If successful,
the substitution that simulates the native function may also serve
as evidence that the system indeed functions in a certain way.
‘‘Imitation’’ emphasizes the a priori notion that the copy will be
distinguishable from the original. ‘‘Duplication’’ is also used to
refer to the intention to produce a copy (likewise distinguishing
it from the original, but commonly less strongly than imitation).
However, if the copies are very accurate, one may reach a stage
where the distinction between the original and the replica be-
comes fuzzy. We will return to this possibility below.
Advances in neuroscience and computing have, in recent
years, drawn increasing attention to the possibility of large-scale
brain simulations (reviewed in de Garis et al., 2010; Eliasmith and
Trujillo, 2014). The potential importance of simulation as one of
the components in the fast developing armamentarium of neuro-













































Figure 1. A Pragmatic Taxonomy of Simulations in Science and Engineering
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Perspectivereport (Bargmann et al., 2014). Currently, the most ambitious
large-scale brain simulation attempt is the Human Brain Project
(HBP), a European Community Flagship Project of Information
and Computing Technologies (ICT). This project develops ICT
platforms, of which the brain simulation platform, which stems
from the Blue Brain project (Markram, 2006), aims to apply
reverse engineering to the brain and proceed toward ultimately
achieving virtual brain capacities on a megacomputer. Consid-
ering the resources required, the assumptions made and the
goals and expectations promoted, the meaning, power, and
timing of large-scale simulations became a topic of a rather lively
discourse in brain research (e.g., Kandel et al., 2013; Courtland,
2014). Given this, it is pertinent to ask: What is simulation in gen-
eral?What does brain simulation expect to simulate, towhat pur-
pose, and what might the outcome and implications be? We do
not pretend to provide answers to all these questions, nor to
enter the ongoing debate concerning the advisable community
investment in large-scale brain simulation in contemporary
neuroscience, but, rather, wish to pinpoint selected conceptual
issues in the hope that they will incite further discussion.
A Pragmatic Taxonomy of Simulations
A taxonomy is useful to distinguish the different roles of simula-
tions in science and engineering in general. We will propose a
pragmatic, heuristic taxonomy based on two main criteria: the
goal of the simulation, and the medium in which the simulation
is embodied (Figure 1). We deem such a pragmatic classification
approach advantageous in illustrating the wide use of simula-tions. Other criteria for taxonomies of simulation are possible,
such as the type of system simulated (e.g., determinate or
’’hard’’ versus indeterminate or ‘‘soft’’; Checkland, 1999) or the
type of method used to implement the simulation (e.g., determin-
istic versus probabilistic modeling in computer simulation; Rob-
inson, 2004; Ross, 2012). These and other types of taxonomies
could replace, or be superimposed on, the taxonomy presented
here.
The goal and the medium of simulation are dependent vari-
ables but more convenient to be discussed separately. We will
start with the discussion of the goal(s) of the simulation. The
goals of the simulation, as well as the medium of simulation dis-
cussed subsequently, are taken here to refer to both the simula-
tion of a state of the system and of a process in the system
(states being spatiotemporal snapshots because a useful simu-
lation should be able to imitate the target as it progresses over
time; Robinson, 2004).
The Goal of Simulation
In experimental science, simulation is one of the four metame-
thods that subserve systematic experimental research (Dudai,
2002). These are observation, the most fundamental of all the
experimental methods, clearly preceding modern science; inter-
vention, currently themost popular method in reductive research
programs, with the aim of inferring function from the dysfunction
or hyperfunction of the system; correlation of sets of observa-
tions or variables extracted from the observations or of the effect
of interventions to identify links between explicit or implicit phe-
nomena and processes; and simulation to verify assumptions,Neuron 84, October 22, 2014 ª2014 Elsevier Inc. 255
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formance, and update and generate hypotheses and models in
which these experimental metamethods are commonly enwrap-
ped (the order in which the metamethods are listed above does
not, of course, imply that they are used in that order in realistic
research programs). Therefore, simulation is used here to pro-
vide a proof of concept (Figure 1) in the course of research and
to promote and achieve understanding (Figure 1) of the system.
When scientists use simulation in this manner, they either
explicitly or implicitly assume that, to genuinely understand a
system, one should be able to reconstruct it in detail from its
components. This assumption resonates with a maxim of scho-
lastic philosophy, resurging in Vico (1988): only the one who
makes something can fully understand it. Understanding as a
cognitive accomplishment is intuitively understood, but its
meaning in science is debated (e.g., Salmon, 1998; Grimm,
2011). Without daring to propose a formal definition, we posit
that, for many scientists, understanding refers to the ability to
generate a specific mental model (or a more encompassing the-
ory) that permits predictions based on scientific reasoning con-
cerning the behavior of the system under different conditions at
the specified or additional level(s) of description. (On the rele-
vance of such predictions to postulated apparent causality,
see Lipton, 2009; Woodward, 2003). One particular point that
is highly pertinent to our discussion is the level of epistemic
transparency assumed to be required to reach an understanding
of the system. In other words, what is the magnitude of the
epistemic lacunae or ‘‘gaps in understanding’’ that one is willing
to tolerate in a simulated model while still claiming that the
simulation increases scientific understanding at the pertinent
level of description. This point is particularly relevant to the
understanding of complex, nonlinear systems such as the brain;
i.e., systems with emergent properties in which the behavior of
the system is unaccountable for by the linear contributions of
the components (e.g., Holland, 2012; but see Laughlin and
Pines, 2000 on whether understanding emergence is essential
for understanding complex systems).
In the brain sciences, understanding is currently realistic with
respect to only a limited number of basic neural operations
and brain functions (Partial Simulation, Figure 1). Some types
of simulations, however, have a long history of being a produc-
tive tool in testing and advancing the partial understanding of
the mechanism of action of neural systems. They are also
considered in attempts to impact the development of artificial
computational systems and brain-inspired technologies (e.g.,
National Robotics Initiative, 2011).
For instance, since the outset of the powerful reductionist
approach to the neurobiology of plasticity and memory, percep-
tual input and motor output of neural systems have been simu-
lated by substitution with direct electrical stimulation of nerve
fibers and of identified sensory or motor nerve cells, respectively
(Kandel et al., 2014). In this type of approach, the artificial agent
that simulates or functionally substitutes the natural component
is further used to manipulate the system to demonstrate that the
modeled state or process is indeed functioning as expected.
Hence, the input of the conditioned stimulus in Pavlovian or
instrumental conditioning is replaced with artificial stimulation
of the natural input to prove that identified parts of the neural cir-256 Neuron 84, October 22, 2014 ª2014 Elsevier Inc.cuit in vivo fulfill, or at least take part in, the role assigned to them
in a model of the functional nervous system (Kandel et al., 2014).
In recent years, powerful tools based on molecular genetics,
biochemistry and biophysics, electronics, and miniaturized mi-
croscopy have been added to the armamentarium that enables
neuroscientists to simulate by substituting in situ identified mo-
lecular and cellular mechanisms to verify the postulated role of
in situ components and mechanisms in perception, memory,
and behavior. Prominent examples of this line of research are
the identification, in the behaving mouse, of brain representa-
tions of specific associations and the generation of synthetic
memory traces of such associations by selective activation of
the specific neuronal circuits by turning on and off artificially en-
gineered miniswitches (receptors or ion channels) in the nerve
cells of these circuits (Garner et al., 2012; Liu et al., 2012).
Many systems and computational neuroscientists, for example,
may not bring this type of methodology into their mind when
prompted to the term simulation, but molecular neurobiologists
do and refer to it specifically as such in their discussions (Kandel
et al., 2014). This only serves to emphasize how widespread the
notion of simulation is and how important it is to clarify what it
means in a given context.
It is also noteworthy that one of the motivations that underlie
the development of the novel methods of microstimulation and
optogenetics (i.e., integration into nerve cells of molecular actu-
ators that respond to colored light) is the assumption that inter-
ventions that simulate mechanisms in the nervous system may,
in time, permit the amelioration of the consequence of lesions
and deficits in the system in the clinic, for example by replacing
missing dopaminergic input in Parkinsonian patients or by re-
placing visual input in the blind (hence using the simulated parts
to manipulate, amend, or substitute parts of the system; System
Manipulation, Figure 1). It is expected that, in the future, such
techniques will contribute to further developments in brain ma-
chine interfaces (BMI) (Hatsopoulos and Donoghue, 2009) and
bionics (Dudai and Morris, 2013), and, hence, will enable the
simulation of normal brain function in semiartificial or artificial
in silico systems (Functional Duplication, Figure 1).
Two additional types of simulation goals are common in engi-
neering and in industry and are also widespread in other domains
of society. One is simulation to allow testing of complex systems
while saving the time, cost, and risk of operating the real system
or in situations in which the real thing is impossible, unwarranted,
or unethical (e.g., war games) (Cost and Risk Reduction, Fig-
ure 1). The other is simulation for the purpose of training and aug-
menting professional proficiency in operating a system (e.g.,
flight simulation) (Operational Proficiency, Figure 1).
The Medium of Simulation
Simulations can be embodied either in the native material from
which the original system is constructed or in an artificial medium
(Native versus Artificial, Figure 1). Simulation of the activity of a
memory circuit in the mouse hippocampus by optogenetic acti-
vation, mentioned above, relies on the operation of the same
cells that are expected to encode the memory in situ. It is of
note, however, that even the reliance on the native medium
(the nerve cells and their connections) involves, in this case,
the introduction of artificial constructs (such as mutated ion
channels or receptors tailored for specific drugs; see above).
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dium (i.e., the biological material) rather than a token of that
type (i.e., the exact type ofmolecule operating in situ). Simulation
of neuronal devices in artificial media is usually referred to as
in silico; e.g., certain types of neuromorphic devices (Indiveri
et al., 2011).
Simulation in an artificial medium is either abstract (e.g., math-
ematical models running a general purpose computer) or con-
crete (involving embodiment in special purpose hardware)
(Figure 1; a similar distinction is abstract versus physical; Check-
land, 1999). In practice, the two may be combined, particularly
because concrete simulation is usually preceded by an abstract
one. Abstract simulation incorporates analytic and numerical
approaches. An ongoing debate in the current brain sciences
concerns the virtues of model-driven, top-down versus data-
driven, bottom-upmodeling (Kandel et al., 2013). It is noteworthy
that in real life, the twoapproachescanbecombinedand, further-
more, that the distinction between data-driven and model
(theory)-driven is not absolute but level-dependent. For example,
bottom-up, large-scale brain simulations (see below) depend on
embedded mathematical models that describe basic neuronal
functions (e.g., membrane excitability), hence they already
embed top-down generalizations at the ‘‘bottom’’ levels.
The distinction between data- and model-driven approaches
applies to concrete simulations as well. Concrete simulation im-
plies embodiment, in either a native scale or an altered scale
(usually miniaturization), in a physical substance. BMI and bi-
onics, noted above, integrate the embodiment of brain function
in an artificial substance (e.g., artificial retina; Shepherd et al.,
2013).
Until quite recently, the life sciences, neuroscience included,
have considered simulation in the context of investigating and
modeling parts of the biological system, or in developing pros-
theses, but not for the purpose of imitating the entire organism
or its brain. In metazoan biology in general and brain research
in particular, we consider it unlikely that complete simulation of
the natural type will be attained in the foreseeable future, if at
all (this is to be distinguished from attempts of partial artificial
replication based on the synthetic copy of the biological code
[Gibson et al., 2010] or to create rudimentary ‘‘artificial brains’’
from stem cells in culture [Lancaster et al., 2013]).
Brain Simulation
In the context of our discussion, we refer to the generic notion
of brain simulation as the attempt to imitate or replicate the
functional brain, either in part or in toto, outside of the brain. In
contemporary neuroscience, this implies modeling on a com-
puter. The ultimate prime aim is to imitate and understand the
native computations, algorithms, states, actions and emergent
behavior of the brain, as well as to promote brain-inspired tech-
nology. The process involves the application of mathematical
models that are preferably constrained by biological information
to experimental or mock data.
Referring to the coordinates on the pragmatic taxonomy chart
(Figure 1), brain simulation is, therefore, performed on an artificial
medium, combining data-driven and model-driven approaches
with the primary goal of gaining an understanding and possibly
functional duplication and aiming at imitating or reproducingthe computational goals and the algorithms used in the native
target but implementing them on a different hardware.
The Entity Called Brain or the Target of Simulation
So far we have discussed brain simulation, but what is the
‘‘brain’’ that brain simulation targets? The immediate reaction
to this question is likely to be slight perplexity, given that brain
scientists can rather easily identify the organ from which they
make their living. But a second thought clarifies the issue. In
real life, brains do not live in isolation. In other words, brains
are complex adaptive systems nested in larger complex adap-
tive systems. They reside in bodies. The interaction between
the brain and the other bodily systems is, in reality, impossible
to disentangle. Our brain receives and sends information to all
other bodily systems, and its state at any given point in time is
determined to a substantial degree by this interaction. That the
brain is a brain in a body cannot be ignored when considering
the goal of simulating the realistic brain.
But the brain in a body, at any given point in time, is, in fact, the
outcome of the individual experience accumulated over the
period preceding this specific point in time. When simulating
the brain, one has therefore to consider the experienced brain
in a body. Neglecting experience sets a severe limit on the
outcome of brain simulation. On the other hand, taking experi-
ence into account necessitates simulating real-life contexts, a
daunting task per se, specifically given that part of the real-life
experience is the interaction over time with the functioning body.
When specifically discussing a hypothetical human brain
simulation, it seems logical to limit our goal to the individual
without ignoring the relevance of the natural, social, and cultural
interactions and contexts over time (Hutchins, 1995). Therefore,
the question of how this limitation may affect the adequacy of
large-scale simulation attempts in due time and their results
must be borne in mind.
On Realistic Hopes and Caveats
Asnoted above, simulation has beena useful generic approach in
science for decades. In some scientific disciplines, it led to
remarkable achievements. For example, the 2013 Nobel Prize in
Chemistry was given for the computer simulation of complex
chemical systems (NobelMedia, 2014). In neuroscience, problem
oriented computer simulations of specific systems and functions
of the brain are extensively used to test predictions, validate con-
clusions and models, and guide hypothesis-driven experiments
and new models at various levels of analysis (Dayan and Abbott,
2005; e.g., Schneidman et al., 1998; Loewenstein and Sompolin-
sky, 2003; Norman, 2010). They are particularly useful, for
example, in the case of complex nonlinear systems when an
analytical solution cannot be obtained by available formal mathe-
matics. Therefore, computer simulations complement the rich
toolbox of neuroscience and may contribute to a better under-
standing of the brain. Their power in driving brain-inspired tech-
nology and neuromorphic computing is also evident. Several
potential issues and caveats should, however, be noted when
considering current attempts at large-scale brain simulations.
Scarcity of Knowledge
Many neuroscientists consider contemporary attempts at large-
scale brain simulations as premature (Courtland, 2014). TheNeuron 84, October 22, 2014 ª2014 Elsevier Inc. 257
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and that productive simulations require established theory and
data (e.g., Kamerlin et al., 2011). Not only do we lack information
about identified types of mostly unknowns such as neuronal
codes, computational goals, algorithms in which these goals
are implemented, or wiring diagrams (‘‘connectoms’’), we may
not have yet even identified other types of unknowns required
tomodel large subsystems of the brain, let alone the whole brain.
Some take the stand that, under these conditions, bottom-up,
large-scale reconstruction in the absence of top-down theory
and recurrent high-level reality checks (see below), i.e., global
physiological andbehavioral output,may leadmucheffort astray.
In the background, even while using the few well established
models for elementary neuronal activity, let alone when building
upon them bottom-up, it is advisable to bear in mind the humble
advice concerning the nature of even the most promising model,
provided by Hodgkin and Huxley, whose canonical equations
serve as a core element in neural and brain simulations: ‘‘The
agreement must not be taken as evidence that our equations
are anything more than an empirical description of the time-
course of the changes in permeability to sodium and potassium.
An equally satisfactory description. could no doubt have been
achievedwith equations of verydifferent form,whichwould prob-
ably have been equally successful in predicting the electrical
behavior of the membrane. .the success of the equations is
no evidence in favor of the mechanism. that we tentatively
had inmindwhen formulating them’’ (Hodgkin andHuxley, 1952).
Collection of data for realistic large-scale brain simulation is not
trivial. Even a highly productive large experimental laboratory
investigating the mammalian brain can produce only limited
amounts of data. Federating data from different labs has to take
into account that even small differences inmethodology and con-
ditions can mean a lot in terms of neuronal state and activity, and
different labs seldom, if ever, use exactly the same conditions and
protocols. The invariants identified under these conditions may
mask important features (see below). This complicates the ability
to merge data from different sources without losing important in-
formation. Heterogeneous data formats also present an obstacle
in sharing. As far as data required for human brain simulation are
concerned, it is sufficient to note that cellular physiology data are
scarce and obtainable from patients only. Functional neuroimag-
ing using fMRI has a limited spatiotemporal resolution, which
currently constraints its applicability to high-resolution brain
simulation, although is useful in obtaining important information
regarding the role of identified brain areas and their functional
connectivity in perceptual and cognitive processes. One possibil-
ity to bridge the gap from the cellular to the cognitive is to use data
from the primate brain, but these data are also still insufficient for
the purpose of large-scale brain simulation.
Epistemic Opacity
Is the aforementioned Vico maxim, which posits that one can
only understand what one is able to build, i.e., that truth is real-
ized through creation, applicable to computer simulation of com-
plex systems? Having fed the information and let the machine
run the computations involving strings of equations and come
upwith emergent properties, dowe really understand the system
better as long as part of the process is epistemically opaque?
And what is it that creates the opaqueness, given that we, in258 Neuron 84, October 22, 2014 ª2014 Elsevier Inc.fact, wrote the equations—the numerical iterations, high dimen-
sionality, nonlinearity, and emergence all combined? This brings
us back to the meaning of understanding. Some will note that,
even in daily life, we claim to understand natural phenomena
without really mentally grasping their inner workings. For ex-
ample, we predict that if we release a ball from a tower, the
ball will fall because of gravity. But is the attraction of physical
bodies transparent to us epistemically, or is our sense of under-
standing due to habituation with the phenomenon or the physical
law? As noted above, the acceptable magnitude of epistemic
opacity in a computer simulation that can predict the outcome
of the behavior of the system is for the individual scientist to
decide and will probably vary with the professional training and
the level of description and analysis.
Computing Power
The computing power required for large-scale simulation of a
mammalian brain is still unavailable. Exascale-level machines
are required, that, if pursued by current technology, will demand
daunting amounts of energy (Kogge, 2011). However, given the
fast pace of advances in computer technology (e.g., Merolla
et al., 2014), this issue will probably be resolved prior to the res-
olution of the scarcity of knowledge problem mentioned above.
The Toll of Data Sampling
Attempts at large-scale brain simulation differ with regard to their
reliance on realistic and detailed brain data, but all currently rely
on limited sampling and statistical typification (de Garis et al.,
2010; Eliasmith and Trujillo, 2014). It is one thing to sample phe-
nomena in experiments in search for mechanisms and to classify
the data to promote modeling and understanding and another to
rely on limited sampling to faithfully build the systemanew. There-
fore, the possibility cannot be excluded that important properties
of real-life neurons in vivo are concealed or minimized in the
process. It is noteworthy that, despite the robustness common
to biological systems, relying on extracted invariants may result
not only in missing data but also in going beyond the data
because of potentially erroneous generalizations. It is also of
note that suchmethodsmay reduce the ability to rely on the simu-
lation to perform new, fine-grained experiments in silico (‘‘higher
order simulation’’), which is contemplated as one of the contribu-
tions of brain simulation (i.e., replacing in vivo or in vitro experi-
ments that are complex, time consuming, and may cause animal
suffering). Further, itmay result in a situation inwhich theoutcome
of an in silico experiment will have to be verified in vivo after all.
Reality Checks
Large-scale simulations are expected to involve iterations in
which the performance of the simulated systems is evaluated
by benchmarks. However, scarcity of knowledge ( see above)
may raise doubts concerning the suitability of such benchmarks
because we do not yet know, in most cases, whether the corre-
lation sought by us of the activity of an identified circuit with spe-
cific physiological or behavioral performance indeed reflects the
native function of the circuit. For example, are place cells primar-
ily sensitive to spatial coordinates or amygdala circuits to fearful
stimuli? Lack of knowledge on the native computational goal
may result in optimizing simulations to misguided or secondary
performance. On the other hand, one may consider using the
fit of simulations to selected benchmarks to explore the compu-
tational goals of the native circuit.
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Much of our scientific progress, understanding, and intellectual
joy stems from our cognitive ability to extract and generalize
laws of nature. Describing the universe in a minimal number of
equations is often equated not only with ultimate understanding
but alsowith beauty (Weinberg, 1992). If we aim to reproduce de-
tails in simulations, do we still advance in understanding in that
respect or do we just imitate nature? Proponents of large-scale
simulations will claim that the reproductions of the details are
practiced to extract new laws that may emerge from the simula-
tion. Besides raising again the issue of epistemic opacity (see
above), a more practical question comes up. Should we expect
a small set of laws to describe a complex adaptive system like
the brain? Some will say that this depends on the level of
description. The brain can be considered as a community of
organs with different functions and phylogenetic history that
renders doubtful the hope to understand in detail the operation
of each by the same task-relevant computations. It still leaves
open the possibility that some basic principles of brain operation
are explainable by a unified theory. However, this depends
on the level of description. Onemay claim that we already under-
stand some fundamental principles of brain operation, for ex-
ample, that spikes encode and transmitters convey information,
but this level of description is obviously not what brain scientists
have inmindwhen trying to understand the brain. It is of note that
high parsimony in realistic models has the potential to ameliorate
epistemic opacity.
All in all, the engagement in large-scale brain simulation
becomes, in our view, a question of knowledge-dependent
timing, proper integration of multiple bottom-up and top-down
approaches, and realistic expectations. It seems that different
large-scale simulation projects do take the realistic expectations
into account in setting their deliverables, for example, by
advancing stepwise on only distinct parts of the brain (e.g., Ya-
mazaki and Igarashi, 2013). Even the initial goal of the neurosci-
ence effort in the HBP, despite its official name that gazes at the
more remote future, is to simulate microcircuits in the mouse
neocortex.
On Selected Hypothetical Scenarios
Science and society should aim to benefit from contemplating
the future and prepare for it, even if this future is not necessarily
around the corner. Suppose, for the sake of argument, that the
brain and computer sciences combined will indeed be able,
one of these days, to come up with a simulated human brain.
What questions will we face?
Similarity of the Simulation to the Original
If the simulation is in silico, there is the obvious dissimilarity that
the simulation versus the original are two different substrates.
The relevance of this dissimilarity can be expected to vary with
theoretical frameworks and contexts. If, for example, one takes
the hypothetical position that consciousness can only arise in a
biological organism (see below), the relevance of the difference
in substrate will be very high because it will entail the further
dissimilarity of being capable versus incapable of possessing
mental states.
The issue of similarity can also be raised, however, within an
in silico universe. Suppose, for the sake of argument, that wesucceed in some imaginary future to generate a faithful simula-
tion of the native human brain that is embodied in neuromorphic
devices, embedded, for example, in humanoid robots.Will we be
able to create legions of identical brains? The question of similar-
ity of such artificial copies of the human brain can be dissected in
terms of internal structure or spatiotemporal location. The ques-
tion can be broken up into two levels: type similarity, i.e., will the
process generate a type of machine that is similar to a generic
brain; and token similarity, i.e., will the process generate specific
copies of an individual brain. In that case, in theory, type similar-
ity is a possibility. However, token similarity is a different ques-
tion. That issue can benefit from the classic discourse in analytic
philosophy, related to Leibniz’s principle (or ‘‘Law’’) of The Iden-
tity of Indiscernibles (Leibniz; in Loemker, 1969). This principle
states that if, for every property F, object x has F if, and only if,
object y has F, then x is identical to y. In other words, no two
distinct things exactly resemble each other because, if they
share all intrinsic and all relational qualities (e.g., spatiotemporal
coordinates), they would then be not two but one. They can,
however, share all intrinsic qualities and still be relationally,
e.g., spatially or temporally, distinct. Formally we do not expect,
therefore, even a future perfect brain simulation project to pro-
duce token identity.
Will Consciousness Emerge?
When mental states of the human brain are considered, con-
sciousness commonly comes up in the discussion. Can con-
sciousness be simulated? For simplicity, we will not discuss
the multiplicity of conscious states in humans and refer to one
type only, which is intuitively appreciated: conscious awareness
involving self-awareness that one is conscious (autonoetic con-
sciousness; Tulving, 1985).
A dominant reductionist conceptual framework posits that
mental states are brain states. Will (or must) intrinsically identical
brains have identical mental states? Will distinct simulated
brains with identical mental states be considered distinct ‘‘indi-
viduals’’? Will they be able to read each other’s ‘‘mind’’? (Pre-
sumably, yes, if they know their intrinsic identity and the answer
to the first question is affirmative.) Will they significantly differen-
tiate even if they share identical experiences? Many brain scien-
tists will posit that they will diverge over time because they
consider the possibility that at least some systems in the brain
will be of the type that is sensitive to minuscule deviations in
the initial states (this also reflects on the improbability of token
identity; see above).
Further, mental states may not correspond on a one-to-one
basis to brain states, or mental states are functions of the brain
with some other relation to brain states; for example, they are
only supervenient or consequential to brain states, come along
with them, but are not necessarily entailed by them in a one-
to-one relation (Kim, 1978) in a way that brain research cannot
yet account for. During much of the 20th century, mainstream
brain science experienced ‘‘psychophobia’’ (Evers, 2009), re-
jecting the study of consciousness from the scientific enterprise.
Today, the situation is quite different, making the questions
raised above relevant not only for philosophy but also for neuro-
science.
But could the computer be conscious at all? At present, avail-
able evidence justifies only a rather tame hypothetical stance. IfNeuron 84, October 22, 2014 ª2014 Elsevier Inc. 259
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ganization or function of biological matter, then brain simulation
will never gain consciousness, whereas, if consciousness is a
matter of organization alone, e.g., extensive functional intercon-
nectivity in a complex system, then it might arise in simulations
in silico.
How Would We Recognize whether a Future Brain
Simulation Is Conscious or Not?
Two main types of approaches can be raised. The first is a Tu-
ring-type test for a conscious entity. However, by itself, this is
insufficient because we can easily imagine a computer being
able to mimic the expected responses of a conscious entity
without experiencing consciousness. The second, provided we
assume faithful imitation of the relevant native brain activity,
identifies activity signatures that reflect conscious awareness
in the human brain. This is in principle similar to the way one at-
tempts to identify sleep and dreams objectively by looking for
characteristic brain activity signatures (Nir and Tononi, 2010).
On one hand, we do not yet know such signatures. On the other
hand, even if they are identified, theymay not exhaust signatures
of conscious awareness in a simulated system. A pragmatic heu-
ristic approach could be a combination of two elements, still
short of a sufficient condition: one, a Turing-type test and the
second an activity signature in the simulated entity that fits the
one expected in the original biological brain and is time-locked
to the responses taken to reflect conscious behavior.
Is Realistic Human Brain Simulation Possible in the
Absence of Consciousness?
It is possible to consider brain simulation without the question of
consciousness arising. However, when processes in the brain
are simulated that are conscious in the human being (for
example, declarative emotion), the following question arises: if
consciousness is not simulated, how adequate can that simula-
tion be?
To illustrate this, one of the proposed goals of human brain
simulation is to increase our understanding of mental illnesses
and to ultimately simulate them in theory and, possibly, in silico,
the aim being to understand them better and to develop im-
proved therapies in due course. But how adequate or informative
can a simulation of, say, depression or anxiety be if there is no
conscious experience in the simulation? The role of conscious-
ness and the effects of this role on the outcome of simulation
of human brain faculties will be important to assess in this
context.
What Can We Gain from Discussing Brain Simulation?
Although we posit that the road to simulation of the human brain,
or even only part of its cognitive functions, is long and uncertain,
we also think that, on the way, much will be learned about the
mammalian brain in general and about the feasibility of transfor-
mation of some efforts in the brain sciences into big science.
New methodologies and techniques are also expected that will
benefit neuroscience at large and probably other scientific disci-
plines as well.
But, given the expected remoteness of the ultimate goal, why
should we engage in discussing some of its conceptual and phil-
osophical underpinnings now?We do advocate such discussion
already at this point in time. Big science brain projects provide an260 Neuron 84, October 22, 2014 ª2014 Elsevier Inc.opportunity to assess and preempt problems that may one day
become acute. In other words, we can use the current attempt
to simulate the mammalian brain as an opportunity to simulate
what will happen if the human brain is ever simulated.
It is rather straightforward to imagine the types of problems a
simulated human brain will incite should it ever become reality in
future generations. They will range from the personal (e.g., impli-
cations concerning alterations of the sense of personhood, hu-
man identity, or anxiety and fear in response to the too similar
other), social (e.g., how shall the new things be treated in terms
of social status and involvement, the law, or medical care), and
ethical (e.g., if we terminate the simulated brain, do we ‘‘kill’’
it in a potentially morally relevant manner). These problems
also require foresight of safety measures to ensure that, in due
time, the outcomes of ambitious brain projects do not harm indi-
viduals and societies. But most of all, by discussing the potential
implications of such projects now, we contribute to the sense
that scientists as individuals and science as a culture should
take responsibility for the potential long-term implications of their
daring projects.
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